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This study investigates the determinants of companies’ voluntary information 
disclosure. Employing a large and unique dataset on the companies’ own earnings 
forecasts and their frequencies, we conducted an empirical analysis of the effects of a 
firm’s ownership, board, and capital structures on information disclosure. Our finding is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the custom of cross-holding among companies 
strengthens entrenchment by managers. We also find that bank directors force managers 
to disclose information more frequently. In addition, our results show the borrowing ratio 
is positively associated with information frequency, suggesting that the manager is likely 
to reveal more when his or her firm borrows money from financial institutions. However, 
additional borrowings beyond the minimum level of effective borrowings decrease the 
management’s disclosing incentive. 
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1. Introduction 
The corporate governance literature has discussed many mechanisms for resolving the 
fundamental issue: the agency problem.
3 Perhaps the most pervasive and important factor 
causing the agency problem between a manager and an investor is the informational 
asymmetries between them.
4  If managers who are better informed about their future 
prospects have divergent incentives with their investors, they may expropriate investors’ 
benefits for their private objectives. 
One of the principal remedies to agency problems is the law. Regulatory interventions 
could give outside investors certain powers to protect their investment against 
expropriation by insiders, and meanwhile, require corporate insiders to enforce investor 
protections, particularly on conveying inside information.
5 In Japan, companies accessing 
capital markets are required to follow The Commercial Code and the Securities and 
Exchange Law. The Commercial Code requires all kinds of companies to prepare 
individual financial statements, consisting of a balance sheet, an income statement, and a 
proposal for distribution and appropriation of retained earnings, and to disclose the 
balance sheet. In addition, the Securities and Exchange Law requires publicly held 
companies to prepare and disclose both consolidated and individual financial statements. 
Furthermore, to enhance the transparency of corporate accounting, since 1974, Tokyo 
Securities Exchange (TSE) has requested the managers of all exchange-listed firms to 
                                                   
3 Berle and Means (1932) and the influential work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasize that the 
managers of publicly traded firms pursue their own private objectives, which need not coincide with 
those of outside investors. 
4 Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985) use information-asymmetry models, arguing that 
managers know more than investors about the firm’s future prospects. 
5 See La Porta et al. (1998) for example, who explore the legal rules covering protection of corporate 
shareholders and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 
countries.    4
submit a Brief Letter of Financial Results, or “Kessan Tanshin” in Japanese (hereafter 
Tanshin) within 70 days of the end of the fiscal year. 
Tanshin has been watched with keen interest by outside investors because it contains 
precious information that is not provided by annual reports. First, traditional financial 
statements do not always provide the forward-looking information that outside investors 
might find useful. In contrast to annual reports, Tanshin reports forecast values for the 
coming year’s sales, ordinary income, profits, and dividends, not just the current year’s 
values. Second, as opposed to earnings-related forecasts delivered by market analysts, 
Tanshin have been made by managers who have superior information to outside investors 
on their firms’ expected future performance, which outside financial analysts are not able 
to know. Moreover, rather than reporting interval estimates or implicit expects, Tanshin 
reports point earnings forecasts.
6 Finally, all firms are required to disclose the forecasts at 
least once a year, but are virtually given a free hand in the decision on the timing and 
frequency of the release. 
The Japanese legal system gives managers the discretion to reveal more or withhold 
corporate information. Some managers reveal information only once to meet the criterion, 
whereas others reveal information more than nine times in the same year. Figure 1 shows 
the trends of frequency from 1996 to 2004. We observe that most companies disclosed 
their earnings forecasts less than twice each year before 2000. In contrast, the number of 
disclosure began to exhibit heterogeneity in 2001. Although the precise reasons behind 
the increase are still to be investigated, we can point out several factors that might have 
contributed to the change. First, all the listed companies will be required to issue financial 
                                                   
6 Skinner (1994) points out that good news disclosures tend to be point or range estimates, whereas bad 
news disclosures tend to be qualitative statements about the current quarter’s earnings.   5
statements every quarter from 2008. Although the quarterly issuance of Tanshin is not 
required, it is possible that some firms began to issue financial statements as well as 
Tanshin to achieve a smooth transition from an annual system to a quarterly system by 
adopting the future system in advance. Second, foreign investors have increased their 
presence in the Japanese stock market. It is possible that company managers felt 
increasing pressure from foreign investors to disclose information to the entire capital 
market. Third, more and more listed companies began to rely on direct finance rather than 
indirect finance for financing their activities. If the role of the main bank system as a 
substitute for other good corporate governance mechanisms is deteriorating, the 
importance of information disclosure to the capital market for firms must increase. The 
latter two aspects motivate this study.
7 
Tanshin data contain several characteristics that provide us with a good opportunity to 
investigate the relationship between information disclosure and firm characteristics. First, 
as noted above, all the listed companies have to issue at least one Tanshin report every 
year that contains forecast of sales, profit, etc., for the coming fiscal year. Therefore, our 
dataset can cover all the listed companies, which prevents self-selection bias. Second, the 
number of Tanshin issued by a company each year is not fixed. Some companies submit 
nine Tanshin a year, whereas some issue just one a year. Therefore, we can utilize this 
information to identify companies’ willingness to disclose their situation to the public. 
Many previous works use the accuracy of analyst forecasts as a proxy of information 
                                                   
7 The released revised accounting standards for information disclosure are as follows: Amendment for 
Accounting Standard for Consolidated Financial Statement (1997), Accounting Standard for 
Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows, etc (1998), Accounting Standard for Interim Consolidated 
Financial Statements (1998), Accounting Standard for Operating Risk, Performance, and Corporate 
Governance (2003).   6
disclosure.
8 One of the potentially serious problems in using the forecast errors is the 
effect of window dressing.
9  This refers to a company that obtains exactly the same 
amount of profits as was forecast by analysts, either because the company previously 
gave the correct information to the public, or because the company manipulated the 
account information to ensure the reported profit matched the forecast value. Although 
frequency information is not completely free from window dressing effects, we expect 
the effects are not serious. To our best knowledge, this is the first study that uses Tanshin 
data for investigating the relationship among management’s earnings forecasts and firm 
characteristics.
10 
Using Japanese data provides an additional advantage for analyzing information 
disclosure. Japanese corporate governance has long been known as a system of bank-
centered financing. Although the effectiveness of the so-called main bank system is now 
under serious debate, many listed companies still borrow nonnegligible amounts of 
money from banks and accept former bankers on their board of directors. By utilizing 
detailed information on the bank–company relationship in Japan, we can investigate the 
effects of the main bank system on information disclosure.
11 
Accordingly, this study examines how a firm’s ownership structure, borrowing from 
financial institutions, relationship with banks, and scale influence the manager’s decision 
                                                   
8 See Koga and Uchino (2006), for example. 
9 Evidence indicates that analysts’ earnings forecasts play a valuable role in improving market 
efficiency (Barth and Hutton 2000). However, Lang and Lundholm’s (1993) study shows that 
management’s disclosure decision has effects on analysts’ decisions. The results of Abarbanell and 
Bushee (1997) suggest that analysts’ forecast revisions fail to include all the information about future 
earnings and, on average, investors appear to recognize this fact. 
10 Kato, Skinner and Kunimura (2006) use Tanshin data to provide evidence on the properties of 
management forecasts in Japan, but do not further investigate the governance mechanism of 
management disclosure.  
11 For example, Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990a, 1990b, 1991) have explored the cross-
sectional differences in corporate governance structures among Japanese Keiretsu and independent 
firms to examine corporate finance theories based on information asymmetry and agency.   7
on information release. With the comprehensive data on Tanshin, this research contributes 
to corporate governance literature in three ways. First, this research makes a crucial 
contribution to the field of corporate disclosure by suggesting that managers’ earnings 
forecasts are overwhelmingly influenced by large shareholders. Furthermore, cross-
holding enhances the entrenchment concern resulting from opaque corporate information. 
Second, a manager whose company performed badly is inclined to release information 
more frequently, possibly in order to establish a reputation for transparent accounting 
reports. Third, financial institutions-oriented financing encourages managers to issue 
frequently. 
The remainder of this research is organized as follows. Section 2 provides our 
research hypotheses and methodology. Section 3 describes the data and descriptive 
statistics for all variables adopted in this research. Section 4 presents the empirical results 
of the determinants of the manager’s disclosure decision, and conducts several robustness 
tests. Section 5 concludes this research. 
 
2.   A Simple Model and Empirical Methodology 
2.1   Model 
This section develops a simple empirical model of information disclosure. As 
discussed in the previous section, Japanese listed firms are required to disclose future 
sales and profit forecasts at least once a year. Suppose at time t, that a company i 
announces to the public through Tanshin that its expected logged sales in 12 months are 
[ ] i t t Sales E , 12 ln + . 
As time passes, the company obtains more information on its business, which implies   8
that the expected value of future sales will change and become more accurate. Suppose 
the company does not issue Tanshin between time t and t t ∆ + . At time t t ∆ + , the expected 
(logged) sales at t+12 become  [ ] i t t t Sales E , 12 ln + ∆ + . 
We define the absolute value of the departure of the expected sales from the previous 
estimate as: 
[] [] i t t i t t t i t t Sales E Sales E , 12 , 12 , ln ln + + ∆ + ∆ + − ≡ δ . (2.1) 
Assume that there is a cost for a firm to issue Tanshin and make its forecast sales 
value public. In such a case, similar to the (s, S) model for inventories or the menu costs 
model for price change, it is natural to regard the issuance of Tanshin as an optimal 
stopping time problem. 
Suppose that following its initial Tanshin announcement, company i issues new 
Tanshin in every fiscal year when and only when: 
i z i t t > ∆ + , δ , (2.2) 
where  i z   is the threshold value of the new information disclosure. Assume the 
threshold value is different among companies and can be written as a function of the 
benefit and cost of issuing new Tanshin, such as: 
() . 0 ' ' , 0 ' , < > − = f f C B f i z it it  (2.3) 
it B   denotes the benefit from issuing new Tanshin. Previous theoretical research
12 
points out that the most important benefit from greater disclosure is a reduction in the 
cost of equity capital. That occurs because greater disclosure can address the adverse 
selection problem resulting from asymmetric information, thereby mitigating the 
investor’s demand for additional compensation for risky uncertainty. Therefore,  it B  can 
                                                   
12 Verrecchia (1982), Diamond and Verrecchia (1991).   9
be regarded as a function of variables that affects the agency problems between outside 
investors and the company manager. 
Among many possible determinants of  it B , we focus on (1) the company’s reliance on 
indirect finance, (2) board composition, (3) ownership concentration, (4) cross-holding, 
and (5) relationship with the bank. 
First, if company i heavily relies on banks or other financial institutions for its 
financial activity, there is not so much gain for the company from information disclosure 
to outside investors. Therefore,  it B  is expected to be small for such a company. Second, if 
outside board members are playing disciplinary roles for the sake of outside investors, as 
found by Weisbach (1988), a company with more outside board members tends to have 
greater benefits from information disclosure. 
The effects of ownership structure and bank relations are somewhat more complicated. 
Among all the corporate investors, large shareholders are in principle able to appoint 
board members representing their interests, and meanwhile they can hire or fire 
incumbent managers. In addition, large shareholders can also exercise their power by 
blocking ratification of unfavorable decisions, which results in a greater value for  it B with 
large shareholders. 
However, large shareholders may also cause adverse effects on  it B . When large 
shareholders effectively control corporations, their policies may result in the 
expropriation of minority shareholders. For example, Morck et al. (1988) report a large 
and significant value discount for US firms with large shareholders. They interpret this 
finding as evidence of managerial entrenchment.
13   Along a similar vein, large 
                                                   
13 The first empirical evidence now recognized as indicative of managerial entrenchment is Johnson et   10
shareholders may harm outside investors’ interests in term of corporate financial 
disclosure. Especially in Japan, many firms mutually hold other companies’ shares and 
cement their relationship through these holdings. This cross-holding reduces the threats 
of hostile takeovers for incumbent managers and strengthens the managers’ benefits at the 
expense of outside investors. In other words, cross-holding among firms weakens 
managers’ incentives to reveal information to the public. In sum,  it B  can be increasing 
with the existence of large shareholders, while it is also likely that cross-holding among 
firms trade off those benefits. 
As the main source of external funding, it has been argued that banks play important 
roles in corporate financing and governance. In Japan, banks not only provide firms with 
loans but also hold firms’ equity. Furthermore, banks send top managers to the board of 
directors of a firm. Acting merely as a lender, a bank will get at most a fixed payment 
(interest and principle) and will care more about a firm’s downside. However, as a 
shareholder, a bank cares much more about the value of the stock that is associated with a 
firm’s performance. The dual roles enhance banks’ incentives to monitor the firms they 
lend to and in which they hold shares.
14 Therefore, there is a view that taking advantage 
of the ability of banks to collect information about their borrowers, bank monitoring 
might be the optimal governance mechanism, when monitoring costs are low and 
takeovers rarely happen.
15 In such a case,  it B  is a decreasing function of the degree of the 
                                                                                                                                                         
al. (1985). 
14 Deposit insurance eliminates the incentive of a bank to monitor a firm for its depositors. However, 
equity is more risky than debt. On the other hand, the bank–borrower relationship may give banks 
informational rents. Relationship banks will have some idea of the firm’s credit quality and will take 
this information advantage in the equity market. 
15 John and Kedia’s (2000) work suggests that different economies would design different optimal 
corporate governance systems. One implication of their analysis is that the optimal governance system 
in Japan may continue to rely on bank monitoring if banks are able to maintain a comparative 
advantage in monitoring.   11
relationship between the company and bank. 
In sum,  it B  is a decreasing function of (1) the degree of indirect finance, and (2) the 
degree of cross-holding. 
it C  in equation (2.3) is the cost for issuing a new Tanshin. One obvious factor from 
the costs is the scale of the company. The bigger the company is, the more costly it is to 
gather correct information on all the company activities. Therefore, we assume  it C  is an 
increasing function of the company scale. 
As an empirical model, we use the following linearized model: 
( ) it it it X it it X it Frequency ε γ δ β δ α + + + = ˆ * ˆ , (2.4) 
where  it Frequency  is the number of Tanshin issued by company i in fiscal year t,  it X  is 
a vector that represents company characteristics such as ownership concentration and 
board composition,  it δˆ  is the absolute value of the departure of the realized sales from its 
forecasted value, and  it ε  is the iid error term. The third term on the right-hand side of 
(2.4), the interaction term of  it X  and  it δˆ , is expected to capture the effects of corporate 
governance on information disclosure. 
Based on the arguments in this section, we set the following hypotheses in relation to 
the sensitivity of information disclosure to the absolute value of the difference between 
the forecast and realized values of company performance. 
 
H1: Need for external funds increases the sensitivity. 
 
H2: Large shareholders increase the sensitivity, whereas cross-holding shares among   12
firms has an adverse effect on information disclosure. 
 
H3: The existence of a bank director increases the sensitivity. 
 
Although γ in (2.4) is the main parameter when we test the above hypotheses, we 
also pay attention to β   because the data we use in the empirical analysis may not 
correspond exactly with  it δˆ . If there are unobservable variables that contain similar 
information to  it δˆ , the interaction effects will appear as a part of β . In such a case, 
β includes the corporate governance effects on information disclosure. 
 
2.1 Methodology 
We employ an ordered probit model to analyze the effects of the determinants of 
frequency of information disclosure.
16 Let  y  be the observed frequency of issuance of 
Tanshin, which is determined by the following model with a latent 
* y : 
e X y + = β
*   ) 1 , 0 ( ~ | Normal X e , (3.1) 
where  X does not contain a constant. Let  J α α α < < < L 2 1 be unknown cutoff points 
(for threshold parameters), and define: 
0 = y   1
* α ≤ y if  
1 = y   2
*
1 α α ≤ < y if  (3.2) 
     M  
                                                   
16 To control unobservable firm characteristics, it is more appropriate to adopt a “fixed effects” model. 
We do not take this approach because 1) with such short time horizons, four years, biases due to 
incidental parameter problems are serious, and 2) fixed effects models significantly weaken the power 
of statistics.   13
J y =   J y if α >
* . 
For example, if  y takes values 0, 1, and 2, then there are two cutoff points:  1 α  and  2 α . 
The parameters α  and β  can be estimated by maximum likelihood. For each i, the log-
likelihood function is: 
[] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[] [ ] ) ( 1 log 1
( ) ( 1 log 1 1 ) ( log 0 1 ) , ( 1 2 1
β α
β α β α β α β α
i J i
i i i i i i
x J y
x x y x y
− Φ − = + +
− Φ − − Φ − = + − Φ = =
L
l  (3.3) 
 
3.   Description of the Sample and Data 
3.1   Sample 
The data used in this study consists of all the listed firms in Japan except foreign 
companies, banks, insurance firms, and securities companies. The sample period covers 
2001–2004. Our datasets are constructed from two main sources. The NEEDS database 
contains data on Tanshin, borrowings, ownership structure, and company financial 
statements, while Toyo Keizai provides us with detailed information on board 
composition, including age, academic background, previous career, director hierarchy, 
and so forth. Therefore, we are able to identify the banking connection from the career 
background of the individual director.
17 From information on the ownership structure and 
shares held by each company, we construct a dataset on cross-holding.
18 
Firms that became bankrupt, merged, or were acquired are omitted from our sample. 
Matching the two main datasets by Nikkei Code
19 and fiscal year, we obtain 2270, 2376, 
                                                   
17 Taking advantage of detailed information on individual directors, we define firms as banking-
connected if they have directors coming from banks on their boards, and non banking-connected firms 
otherwise. In addition, it should be noted that we include neither executive directors, who do not have 
obligations or responsibilities for managing and monitoring, nor statutory auditors, for they are barred 
from performing management function in the sample. 
18 We used annual reports to check the contents of the Nikkei and Toyo Keizai datasets. 
19 The Nikkei code is compiled by Nikkei Economics Inc. for exchange-listed and OTC firms. Unlike the   14
2389, and 2414 observations for 2001–2004, respectively. 
 
3.2   Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 reports the frequency of Tanshin disclosure. Frequency is calculated from the 
total number of forecasts within one year. The sample shows disclosure frequency 
increased from 2001 to 2004. The mean frequency of 3.8 in 2004 is significantly higher 
when compared to a value of 2.06 in 2001. 
Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics on the explanatory variables used in this study. 
For 2001–2004, the Top 10 shareholders and “the special few” shareholders together hold 
about 50% of all the shares, whereas foreign shareholders hold only 5.8% of shares.
20 
That is to say, overall, the listed firms in Japan have been dominated by large 
shareholders.
21 In addition, the ratio of borrowing to assets averaged 21% during this 
period. This implies that firms still relied heavily on indirect financing when they raised 
corporate funds; at the same time, 34% of listed firms further cement the relationship 
with banks by accepting the banker directors on their director of boards. That also shows 
that listed firms still kept tight relationships with their main banks in the early 2000s.
22 
We employ return on equity (ROE), and return to assets (ROA) to measure firm 
                                                                                                                                                         
Tosho code (where company IDs are created by the Tokyo Stock Exchange), the Nikkei code for firms, 
which is repealed from stock exchange trading, is retained.  
20 It should be noted that we take lagged values of all variables except ROE, ROA, and the forecast 
deviation. However, owing to a lack of data on the composition of majority shareholders for 2000, we do 
not have the special shareholders’ ratio, the bank shareholder’s ratio, the foreign shareholder’s ratio, 
the cross-holding ratio, and the bank cross-holding ratio in Table 5. 
21 Prowse (1992) shows that the top five shareholders of all listed Japanese corporations hold 33.1% of 
the firms’ shares on average, and households and foreign shareholders hold only 31.7%. 
22 We have also regressed the frequency of reporting on the ratio of outside directors to board size 
(outsider’s ratio), but the result is not significant. The outsider’s ratio has decreased slightly from 
40.4% in 2001 to 35.5% in 2004. Most outside directors are from the banking industry. This implies that 
firms still regarded the connection with banks as a helpful means to raise capital in the early 2000s, 
despite the fact that the effectiveness of the main bank system had been seriously criticized. 
   15
performance. Japanese firms had ROE of –0.67 in 2001, and better performance lifted 
this to 3.4 in 2004. As well, a number of variables are controlled to capture the 
fundamental determinants of the frequency of managements’ earnings forecasts. First, for 
firms with the highest forecast frequency that tend to also show the highest 
contemporaneous forecast, potential endogeneity can be mitigated by controlling the 
forecast deviation, which is calculated as the absolute value of the difference between the 
realized value and the initial forecast value. The forecast deviation provides an estimate 
of the unexpected portion of the management forecast. Second, firm size is measured as 
the logarithmic value of total assets deflated by the CPI. During the four years from 2001 
to 2004, the scale of firms did not show any expansion. Moreover, it is known that 
disclosure policies have been changing over time. Therefore, a year dummy controls for 
time trends in frequency of disclosure. Finally, firms played various strategies across 
different industries. The primary industries of sample firms are divided into 33 different 
three-digit industry codes, defined by Nikkei Economics Inc. We also have dropped the 
extreme 1% of all variables except the indicator of the bank-relation variable. 
In addition, the third term on the right-hand side of equation (2.4), the interaction 
term of  it X , and the interaction term of  it δˆ   are measured by multiplying forecast 
deviation with ownership structure, board structure, the borrowing ratio, and the firm’s 
scale, respectively. Those interaction terms pick up the pure effects of corporate 
governance on the information disclosure. 
 
4.   Empirical Results 
The main empirical results of estimations of (3.3) are reported in Table 5. Model 1 of   16
Table 5 reports that the variable ‘Top 10 shareholder’ is significantly and negatively 
related to the frequency. The borrowing ratio and banker directors contribute to the 
frequency. However, firm size and performance are negatively associated with the 
managers’ incentives to release information. This indicates concentrated ownership firms 
and big firms are likely to less reveal financial information to the public. However, 
managers are pushed into revealing information to suggest financial transparency under 
the following situations: 1) firm performance goes down; 2) the firm raises funds through 
financial institutions; 3) there is a banker director on the board; and 4) the foreign 
shareholders’ ratio is high, which is consistent with the common perception that foreign 
shareholders expect more financial transparency than domestic investors and therefore 
contribute to a higher frequency of disclosure. 
In model 2 of Table 5, we observe a negative and significant coefficient for the cross-
holding ratio, indicating that cross-holding is the most important factor in weakening 
managements disclosing incentives. The focus of model 3 of Table 5 is the effect of 
corporate governance on the disclosing strategy. We recast model 2 by adding interaction 
terms between the forecast deviation and the firms’ fundamental characteristics. The 
results show explicitly that the borrowing ratio is positively associated with management 
announcement, and there is a statistically significant interaction between the forecast 
error and the amount of a company’s borrowings from financial institutions. This implies 
that an additional company’s borrowing from financial institutions yields a stronger 
decrease in the frequency of earnings forecasts for a lower forecast error. In Table 5’s 
model 4, we replace the ‘Top 10’ ratio with the special few shareholders’ ratio, and in 
model 5, we use ROA as a proxy instead of ROE. We obtain similar results.   17
In sum, the results in Table 5 support our hypotheses 1 and 3, suggesting that raising 
funds through financial institutions and attracting foreign investors push managers into 
consciously revealing earnings forecasts. Bank directors play a positive role in addressing 
the asymmetric information problem. On the other hand, our results do not support 
hypothesis 2, suggesting that stable large shareholders have an overwhelming power to 
negatively influence management forecasts.  Meanwhile, among the large shareholders, 
cross-holding worsens the effects on management announcements. Ironically, the higher 
disclosure frequency does not necessarily indicate that firms have better performance. 
Instead, it might indicate that managers increase disclosure frequency for the purpose of 
yielding a positive reputation effect. 
Table 6 and Table 7 test the robustness of the finding that controlling shareholder, 
crossholding ratio, firm size and firm performance have significantly negative effect on 
information disclosure, whereas borrowing ratio and banking directors bring significantly 
positive effect on information disclosure. The results in Table 6 and Table 7 are consistent 
with the previous results, although crossholding ratio does not have a statistically 
significant coefficient when interaction terms are included in Table 7.    
In sum, empirical evidence leads us to the conclusion that firms with concentrated 
ownership are relatively reluctant to disclose corporate information. More specifically, 
cross-holding heightens the asymmetric information problem. Interaction terms Firms 
with a small scale or with decreasing performance tend to reveal information more 
frequently. We conjecture that that is because when firms are at the limit of their 
advantage scale, or performing poorly, they compete with their industrial peers by 
revealing corporate information frequently in order to attract public attention. In addition,   18
we confirm the implication of previous studies, which is that information disclosure has a 
positive effect on reducing capital costs, and thereby firms tend to consciously reveal 
financial information to the public owing to their need for external finance. Further, our 
results are consistent with Diamond’s (1984) work, which shows that delegated 
monitoring by a banker may be efficient as a means of avoiding duplication of 
monitoring by small investors, but contrast with former literature employing analyst’s 
forecast accuracy by Koga and Uchino (2006). 
 
5.   Conclusions 
This study has investigated the determinants of managers’ information disclosure 
decisions in Japanese listed firms. More specifically, we explore the effects of ownership 
structure, borrowings from financial institutions, bank relationship, and firm size on a 
manager’s disclosure frequency. Our main findings are as follows. 1) large shareholders 
have negative effects on a manager’s forecast frequency, and furthermore, large cross-
holding shareholders increase the concern of entrenchment resulting from opaque 
corporate information; 2) a high borrowing ratio is favorable to information disclosure; 3) 
larger firms are reluctant to convey information to the public; and finally, 4) poorly 
performing firms are likely to advertise themselves via earnings forecasts. 
Our results are statistically robust and imply that companies whose shares are 
concentrated among a few groups do not regard their information disclosure to the public 
as seriously as do other firms. Nevertheless, we recognize that a large residual effect 
remains and that this effect might be correlated with measures of the concentration of 
firms. The effects of the Top 10 shareholder’s rate and of the majority shareholder’s rate   19
should be further clarified. Meanwhile, we would like to consider the effect of 
fluctuations in stock prices on managers’ disclosure decisions for our next project. 
Ultimately, we recognize that frequency of information disclosure does not 
completely address concerns about firm manipulation. Although we are certain that this 
proxy is the best choice when alternatives are not known, we should continue our quest 
for better proxies.   20
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Table 1. Variable Definition 
Variables Definition  Time 
Frequency Frequency  of  forecasting 
announcements. 
 
Ownership Proxies     
Top  10  ratio  Ratio of shares held by top 10 
shareholders. 
Lagged value 
Special  ratio  Percentage of shares held by the 
“special few”, which consists of the top 
then shareholders, directors and their 
relatives. Only stable holdings are 
included. 
Lagged value 
Foreigner  ratio  Ratio of shares held by foreigner 
investors. 
Lagged value 
Board Proxies     
Bk director  Binary variable taking the value 1 if the 
firms have banker directors on their 
boards and zero otherwise. 
Lagged value 
Outside  board  ratio  The ratio of outside directors to total 
directors. 
Lagged value 
External fund     
Borrowing ratio  The ratio of borrowing to total assets.  Lagged value 
Entrenchment Proxies     
Crossholding  ratio  The ratio of shares held by majority 
shareholders whose shares are also held 
by the firm itself. 
Lagged value 
Performance Proxies     
ROE  The ratio of operating income to equity.  Current value 
ROA  The ratio of operating income to assets 
deflated by the CPI. 
Current value 
Control Proxies     
Firm size  Natural  Logarithms of (total assets 
deflated by the CPI). 
Lagged value 
Forecast deviation  The  absolute value of the relative 
difference between achieved sales and 
forecasted sales 
Current value   23
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of frequency from 1996 to 2004 
Year N Mean Median Min SD Max
1996 1984 1.12 1 1 0.325 2
1 9 9 7 2 0 4 0221 0 . 0 4 9 52
1 9 9 8 2 1 0 4221 0 . 0 4 3 62
1 9 9 9 2 1 3 7221 0 . 0 7 1 63
2000 2168 1.99 2 1 0.0856 2
2001 2270 2.06 2 1 0.299 4
2002 2376 3.16 3 1 0.973 7
2003 2389 3.63 4 1 1.24 9
2004 2414 3.8 4 1 1.28 9
Note: The sample consists of nonfinancial and nonforeign companies  25
Table 3. The pairwise correlation coefficients among the variables used in this study 
 
 Count  Top  10  Special Foreign Borrow Cross Banker  Outside  ROE ROA Asset Deviation
Count 1     
Top 10  0.0102  1   
Special 0.0113  0.9290*  1  
Foreign –0.0178  –0.0560*  –0.1221* 1  
Borrow –0.0639*  –0.1704*  –0.1706* –0.0955* 1  
Cross –0.0164  –0.0087  –0.011 –0.2402* 0.0472* 1  
Banker –0.0226*  –0.1380*  –0.1449* –0.0499* 0.0368* 0.1657* 1 
Outside  0.0622* 0.3461* 0.3470* –0.1134* –0.0912* 0.0912* 0.1625*  1
ROE 0.0015  0.0132  0.0155 0.0073 0.0058 –0.0250* –0.0135  –0.0171 1
ROA  –0.0313* 0.1354* 0.0906* 0.1696* –0.0755* –0.2974* –0.0159  –0.018 0.0743* 1
Asset  –0.1146* –0.2790* –0.3731* 0.4078* –0.0014 –0.0443* 0.0079 –0.2325* –0.0034 0.0903* 1
Deviation 0.0445* 0.0245* 0.0582* 0.0453* –0.0256* 0.0223* –0.0165 0.0813* –0.1776* –0.1690* –0.1247* 1
Top  10*D 0.0169 0.1307* 0.1339* 0.0387* –0.0269* 0.0289* –0.0289* 0.0770* –0.0243* –0.0504* –0.0938* 0.9407*
Special*
D  0.0747* 0.1237* 0.1478* –0.0019 –0.0357* 0.0065 –0.0428* 0.1103* –0.1783* –0.1208* –0.1442* 0.9457*
Foreign*
D  –0.015 –0.0024 –0.0103 0.4126* –0.0438* –0.0503* –0.0302*  0.0078 0.0001 0.0156 0.0366* 0.5821*
Borrow*
D  0.0064 –0.0831* –0.0753* –0.0705* 0.5479* 0.0490* 0.0418*  –0.0142 –0.0082 –0.0870* –0.0426* 0.1230*
Cross*D 0.0257* 0.0111 0.0264 –0.0389* –0.0067 0.2619* 0.0167  0.0569* –0.0259* –0.1572* –0.0704* 0.6412*
Banker*
D  –0.0053 –0.0623* –0.0682* –0.0145 0.0335* 0.0654* 0.3755*  0.0938* –0.0194* –0.1379* –0.0405* 0.4327*
Outside*
D  0.0770* 0.0900* 0.0910* 0.0087 –0.0349* 0.0337* 0.0007 0.2812* –0.3411* –0.1318* –0.1255* 0.8338*
Asset*D 0.015  0.0115 0.0444* 0.0776* –0.0231 0.0351* –0.0161 0.0721* –0.1453* –0.1031* –0.0673* 0.9869*
   26
Table 3 (continued) 









Top 10*D  1    
Special*
D  0.9987* 1   
Foreign*
D  0.5619* 0.4863* 1  
Borrow*
D  0.0790* 0.0797* 0.0054 1  
Cross*D 0.6699* 0.3939* 0.2458* 0.0770* 1 
Banker*
D  0.1956* 0.1166* 0.1569* 0.3031* 0.1483* 1
Outside*
D  0.8229* 0.7803* 0.3699* 0.0503* 0.6280* 0.2371* 1
Asset*D 0.9297* 0.9266* 0.5680* 0.1295* 0.7324*  0.3015* 0.8409* 1  27
Table 4. 
Descriptive statistics on independent variables used in the empirical regression 
 for 2001–2004 
Variable Overall 2001 2002 2003 2004
Mean 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.5 0.5
Median 0.47 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.48
Mean 0.49 0.47 0.49 0.5
Median 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.49
Mean 0.058 0.059 0.056 0.056
Median 0.019 0.02 0.017 0.018
Mean 0.027 0.041 0.024 0.018
M e d i a n 0 000
M e a n 0 . 20 . 2 10 . 1 90 . 1 90 . 1 9
Median 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.15
Mean 0.35 -0.67 -1.7 0.27 3.4
Median 2.8 2.6 1.8 2.6 4.1
Mean 3.5 3.7 2.9 3.4 4
Median 2.8 3 2.3 2.8 3.2
Mean 0.34 0.37 0.35 0.34 0.32
M e d i a n 00000
Mean 0.26 0.24 0.26 0.27 0.27
Median 0.2 0.19 0.2 0.21 0.2
Mean 11 11 11 11 11
Median 11 11 11 11 11
Mean 0.08 0.11 0.079 0.073 0.071
Median 0.045 0.062 0.044 0.039 0.042
Mean 0.039 0.051 0.035 0.037 0.032
Median 0.021 0.029 0.019 0.018 0.019
Mean 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.034
Median 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.019
Mean 0.0049 0.043 0.035 0.035
Median 0.0074 0.00079 0.00058 0.00061
Mean 0.0017 0.027 0.0013 0.0011
M e d i a n 0 000
Mean 0.017 0.021 0.015 0.016 0.013
Median 0.0045 0.0073 0.0042 0.0036 0.0037
Mean 0.027 0.042 0.028 0.02 0.021
M e d i a n 00000
Mean 0.026 0.027 0.026 0.026 0.023
Median 0.0066 0.084 0.0058 0.006 0.0067
M e a n 0 . 8 3 1 . 10 . 7 60 . 7 40 . 6 9





















Note: The sample includes all nonfinancial and nonforeign companies. We Winsorize the outliers of all variables 
and use the lagged values of all variables except ROE and forecast deviation. The foreigner shareholders’ ratio and 
the cross-holding ratio are not reported on this table due to the lack of data on the composition of majority 
shareholders in 2000. The Top 10 shareholders’ ratio is the ratio of shares controlled by the top 10 shareholders. 
The borrowing ratio is the ratio of total borrowings from financial institution to total assets. ROE is the ratio of 
operating income to total equities. ROA is the ratio of operating income to total assets. Banker director is a binary 
variable taking a value of 1 if the firm has a banker director on its board and zero otherwise. The outside director 
ratio is the ratio of directors from outside to the total number of directors. Firm size is a logarithm of the value of 
total assets deflated by the CPI. The forecast deviation is the absolute value of the difference between the realized 
value and the initial forecast value.   28
 
Table 5. Ordered Probit model of frequency and firms’ characteristics 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Top10 shareholders’ ratio –.413*** –.446*** –.383** –.297*
(3.76) (3.83) (2.32) (1.81)
Special shareholders’ ratio –.351*
(1.95)
Foreign shareholders’ ratio .351* .384* 0.453 .584* 0.357
(1.63) (1.70) (1.44) (1.82) (1.15)
Crossholding ratio –.638** –0.455 –0.54 –0.151
(2.36) (1.28) (1.51) (0.402)
Borrowing ratio .285*** .287*** .496*** .414*** .368***
(3.27) (3.07) (3.73) (3.13) (2.56)
Banker director .0679** .0717** .0913** .0992** .106**
(2.22) (2.22) (1.99) (2.17) (2.17)
Outside director0 .0439 0.0638 0.054 0.0361 –0.0261
(0.67) (0.91) (0.532) (0.359) (0.241)
ROE –.00451*** –.0037*** –.00409*** –.00305**
(3.86) (2.93) (3.24) (2.16)
ROA –.0203***
(4.57)
Firm size –.061*** –.0593*** –.08*** –.0764*** –.085***
(4.55) (4.2) (4.05) (3.81) (3.98)
Forecast deviation2 .49*** 3.04*** 0.515 1.47 1.31
(10.4) (11.5) (0.18) (0.503) (0.401)




Foreign*Deviation –0.684 –2.81 –0.443
(0.167) (0.668) (0.11)
Cross*Deviation –3.26 –2.52 –6.73
(0.923) (0.69) (1.76)
Borrow*Deviation –3.56** –3.05** –2.64
(2.11) (1.86) (1.43)
Banker*Deviation –0.337 –0.327 –0.18
(0.617) (0.593) (0.306)
Outside*Deviation 0.0436 -0.0987 -0.271
(0.0372) (0.0868) (0.218)
Asset*Deviation .378* 0.309 0.321
(1.55) (1.24) (1.19)
Year20022 .15*** -.592*** -.593***
(38.4) (16.5) (16.5)
Year2003 2.62*** -.15*** -.149*** .436*** .403***
(43.8) (4.14) (4.12) (12.8) (10.6)
Year20042 .78*** .59*** .523***
(45.8) (16.7) (13.4)
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of observations 7535 5564 5564 5566 4769
Log Likelihood –8681 –8019 –8013 –7998 –6969
chi2 2396 640 656 654 514 
Note: The sample includes all nonfinancial and nonforeign companies. We winsorize the outliers of all 
variables and use lagged values of all variables except ROE, ROA, and forecast deviation. The Top 10 
shareholders’ ratio is the ratio of shares controlled by the top 10 shareholders. The foreign 
shareholders’ ratio is the ratio of shares controlled by foreign shareholders. The borrowing ratio is the 
ratio of total borrowings from financial institution to total assets. ROE is the ratio of operating income 
to total equities. ROA is the ratio of operating income to total assets. Banker director is a binary 
variable taking a value of 1 if the firm has a banker director on its board and zero otherwise. The 
outside director ratio is the ratio of directors from outside to the total number of directors. Firm size is 
a logarithm of the value of total assets deflated by the CPI. The forecast deviation is the absolute value 
of the difference between the realized value and the initial forecast value.   29
Table 6. Ordered Probit, Ordered Logit, and OLS of frequency 
and firms’ characteristics without interaction terms  
Variable oprobit ologit xtreg
Top 10 shareholders’ ratio -.446*** -.719*** -.416***
(3.83) (3.55) (3)
Foreign shareholders’ ratio .384* .72* 0.416
(1.7) (1.77) (1.58)
Crossholding ratio -.638** -1.1** -.634**
(2.36) (2.35) (2.08)
Borrowing ratio .287*** .502*** .235**
(3.07) (3.06) (2.11)
Banker director .0717** .118** .0772**
(2.22) (2.1) (2.03)
Outside director 0.0638 0.115 0.07
(0.91) (0.94) (0.835)
ROE -.0037*** -.00678*** -.00247*
(2.93) (3.11) (1.9)
Firm size -.0593*** -.106*** -.059***
(4.2) (4.31) (3.52)
Forecast devation 3.04*** 5.17*** 3.12***
(11.5) (11) (11.2)
Year 2002 -.592*** -1*** -.618***
(16.5) (16) (19.1)
Year 2003 -.15*** -.277*** -.159***
(4.14) (4.31) (4.76)
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes
N 5564 5564 5564
ll -8019 -8027
chi2 640 598 734 
Note: The sample includes all nonfinancial and nonforeign companies. We Winsorize the 
outliers of all variables and use lagged values of all variables except ROE, ROA, and forecast 
deviation. The Top 10 shareholders’ ratio is the ratio of shares controlled by the top 10 
shareholders. The foreign shareholders’ ratio is the ratio of shares controlled by foreign 
shareholders. The borrowing ratio is the ratio of total borrowings from financial institution to 
total assets. ROE is the ratio of operating income to total equities. ROA is the ratio of 
operating income to total assets. Banker director is a binary variable taking a value of 1 if the 
firm has a banker director on its board and zero otherwise. The outside director ratio is the 
ratio of directors from outside to the total number of directors. Firm size is a logarithm of the 
value of total assets deflated by the CPI. The forecast deviation is the absolute value of the 
difference between the realized value and the initial forecast value. Robust t values are 
presented in the parentheses, where *, **, and *** indicate that p<.1, p<.05, and p<.01, 
respectively.   30
Table 7. Ordered Probit, Ordered Logit, and OLS of frequency 
and firms’ characteristics with interaction terms 
Variable oprobit ologit xtreg
Top 10 shareholders’ ratio –.383** –.556* –0.295
(2.32) (1.92) (1.62)
Foreign shareholders’ ratio 0.453 0.775 0.416
(1.44) (1.36) (1.23)
Crossholding ratio –0.455 –0.746 –0.399
(1.28) (1.2) (1.04)
Borrowing ratio .496*** .865*** .397***
(3.73) (3.66) (2.72)
Banker director .0913** .146* .103**
(1.99) (1.82) (2.05)
Outside director 0.054 0.126 0.0159
(0.532) (0.709) (0.143)
ROE –.00409*** –.00739*** –.00277**
(3.24) (3.4) (2.13)
Firm size –.08*** –.139*** –.0806***
(4.05) (3.92) (3.69)
Forecast devation 0.515 1.58 0.503
(0.18) (0.289) (0.164)
Top 10*Deviation –1.02 –2.58 –2.03
(0.532) (0.732) (0.977)
Foreign*Deviation –0.684 –0.259 0.476
(0.167) (0.0329) (0.111)
Cross*Deviation –3.26 –5.84 –4.03
(0.923) (0.903) (1.08)
Borrow*Deviation –3.56** –6.26** –2.7*
(2.11) (2.03) (1.54)
Banker*Deviation –0.337 –0.44 –0.447
(0.617) (0.448) (0.756)
Outside*Deviation 0.0436 –0.416 0.761
(0.0372) (0.202) (0.621)
Asset*Deviation .378* 0.625 .4*
(1.55) (1.34) (1.53)
Year 2002 -.593*** -1*** –.619***
(16.5) (16) (19.1)
Year 2003 -.149*** -.276*** –.159***
(4.12) (4.29) -4.75
Industry Dummy Yes Yes Yes
N 5564 5564 5564
ll –8013 –8020
chi2 653 639 701  
Note: The sample includes all nonfinancial and nonforeign companies. We Winsorize the outliers of all 
variables and use lagged values of all variables except ROE, ROA, and forecast deviation. The Top 10 
shareholders’ ratio is the ratio of shares controlled by the top 10 shareholders. The foreign 
shareholders’ ratio is the ratio of shares controlled by foreign shareholders. The borrowing ratio is the 
ratio of total borrowings from financial institution to total assets. ROE is the ratio of operating income 
to total equities. ROA is the ratio of operating income to total assets. Banker director is a binary 
variable taking a value of 1 if the firm has a banker director on its board and zero otherwise. The 
outside director ratio is the ratio of directors from outside to the total number of directors. Firm size is 
a logarithm of the value of total assets deflated by the CPI. The forecast deviation is the absolute value 
of the difference between the realized value and the initial forecast value. Robust t values are presented 
in the parentheses, where *, **, and *** indicate that p<.1, p<.05, and p<.01, respectively.   31
Data Appendix 
Identification of cross-holding 
We calculate two types of cross-shareholders, based on merging the Nikkei large 
shareholder database (okabunusi) with the Nikkei company shareholding database 
(kigyohoyukabu database). The cross-shareholder is defined as a shareholder who is 
one of the largest 30 shareholders of the company, and whose shares are also held by 
the company. It should be noted that we do not include the shares held by a 
company’s subsidiaries. In addition, in order to investigate the effect of the banking 
relationship on information disclosure, we subdivide large cross-shareholders into 
large banking cross-shareholders who are in banking industry and others. 
For example, to identify a cross-shareholder of Kyokuyo Company in 2001, we 
first check the major shareholders of Kyokuyo Company in 2001. As we can see from 
Table A1, Daiwa Bank, which owns 4.99% of shares is the largest shareholder of 
Kyokuyo, and Tyuogyorui Company, which owns 0.6% of shares is the thirtieth 
largest shareholder of Kyokuyo. According to the Nikkei shareholding company 
holding database, we observe that among the thirty largest shareholders, Kyokuyo 
holds the shares of five companies, Daiwa Bank, Mitsubishi Trust, Tokai Bank, 
Sakura Bank, and Tyuogyorui Company. Therefore, we calculate a large cross-
holding ratio as the summation of the shareholding rate of those six companies. 
Thereby, we obtain a large cross-holding ratio of 10.04, and a large banking cross-
holding ratio of 9.44, which is the summation of the shareholding rate of Daiwa Bank 
(4.99), Mitsubishi Trust (2.89), Tokai Bank (0.88), and Sakura Bank (0.68).   32
Table A1 
nkcode msdname msnkcode msratio  cross 
1 Daiwa  Bank  70011 4.99  1 
1 Norinchukin  Bank  28948 4.98  0 
1 Shinsei  Bank,  Ltd.  70002 3.89  0 
1 Mitsubishi  Trust  70081 2.89  1 
1  Sumitomo M.& F. Ins.  70503 2.81  0 
1 Toyo  Seikan  919 2.78  0 
1  Mitsui M.& F. Ins.  70502 2.73  0 
1  Tokyo M.& F. Ins.  70501 1.73  0 
1  Yasuda F.& M. Ins.  70505 1.68  0 
1  UBS AG (London) Asia Equities  9999999 1.55  0 
1  Chuo Mitsui Trust & Banking  70084 1.53  0 
1 Daiya  Co.  9999999 1.42  0 
1  Chuo Mitsui Money Trust  9999999 1.29  0 
1 Miyaichi  Co.  9999999 1.15  0 
1  Mitsui Trust, Trust Dept.  9999999 1.11  0 
1 Kyoei  Co.  9999999 1.02  0 
1 Kyokuyo  Akitsukai  9999999 0.96  0 
1  Tokyo Mutual Life Ins., Ippan  9999999 0.94  0 
1  Norinchukin Trust & Banking Co  9999999 0.94  0 
1  Lehman Brothers Asia Capital  9999999 0.9  0 
1 Tokai  Bank  70012 0.88  1 
1  Toyo Trust, Trust Acc. A  9999999 0.8  0 
1 Japan  Securities  Finance  70514 0.76  0 
1 Nomura  Securities  70204 0.76  0 
1  Japan Trustee Services Bank  9999999 0.72  0 
1 Societe  Generale  Paris  OBE  9999999 0.69  0 
1 Sakura  Bank  70005 0.68  1 
1 Senba  Sangyo  9999999 0.62  0 
1 Tyuogyorui  1573 0.6  1 
 
 